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One prevalent narrative describing Britain’s relationship to Europe recounts the continent’s 
allegedly almost blind admiration for Britain as a more advanced ‘other’ in its northern seas: 
Europe looks up to the island’s unique political institutions, its tradition of the rule of law 
and its technological progress. This list of things Europeans supposedly venerate about 
Britain can easily be extended to include its education system, the civilizing mission behind 
its colonial grip on much of the world, and its population’s cultural finesse. In view of 
Britain’s political elites, there always was a lot that made Britain, over the past centuries, 
the envy of the world, a proudly civilised nation among an amorphous mass of less 
advanced countries further east and south. It is on this basis that Britain still prides itself of 
‘British values’, without giving much consideration to the fact that democracy, civic rights or 
the rule of law have never described nationally exclusive concepts, that they reflect in fact 
human values. For centuries these values have been promoted in many different parts of 
the world, including in countries that still today struggle with the legacies of British 
imperialism and its slave economy. The colonies used exactly those values to free 
themselves from British oppression. 
I started with Europe to arrive at Britain’s global Empire, two things that are in fact 
closely connected. Since the beginning of the early modern period Britain was part of an 
Atlantic and of a wider imperial world, but it was also closely linked to continental Europe. 
Britain’s imperial power greatly benefited from this connection, taking advantage of 
Europeans’ financial, material and human input. As Stephen Conway has recently argued, 
European soldiers, settlers, scientists, sailors, clergymen, merchants and technical experts 
became ‘Britannia's auxiliaries’. Some supporters of Brexit seem to ignore this close 
connection when they refer to Britain’s past greatness and imperial legacy to argue that a 
free nation can treat the entire world the same, where Europe and its economy are in no 
way different from any other trading partner anywhere in the world. This view of the world 
is based on countless ‘unilateralisms’, not much different from Donald Trump’s vision of the 
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United States’ future economic relations with the world. In the case of Britain, any such 
view is dependent on the conviction that the own nation, for historical reasons, is unique 
and as such the source of foreign envy. The following survey will show that this idea, rather 
than representing a historical reality, stands for a British projection on Europe and the 
world. It is the expression of an almost obsessive amour proper that has little in common 
with the view that Europe and the rest of the world has of Britain. 
Did Europe ever share this idea of Britain’s superior uniqueness?  A look into the 
historian’s sourcebook can shed light on mutual perceptions; and here Italian responses to 
Britain’s role in the world will serve as a particularly pertinent example of a much more 
differentiated view. In 1851, the Italian philosopher and former Prime Minister of Piedmont-
Sardinia Vincenzo Gioberti described England polemically as ‘the Sicily of Europe’: an 
oceanic island in the continent’s northern periphery, whose connection to Europe was on 
par with Sicily’s relationship to the Italian peninsula. Within this comparison Sicily stood for 
the most backward part of the Italian peninsula whose inhabitants, due to natural 
conditions and historical fate, lived in a different world, closer to Africa than to Europe. 
Gioberti’s idea of placing Britain within the extreme periphery of European civilisation did 
not emerge in a heated debate with political adversaries in parliament. It was not a slander 
reported by British police spies who had overheard a bunch of drunken revolutionaries in a 
London pub. Instead, Gioberti presented his idea of Britain’s relationship to Europe in one of 
the most influential works of modern Italian political thought: volume one of his famous Del 
Rinnovamento Civile d’Italia, which presented its readers with a blueprint for Italy’s political 
unification. Within this scheme, Gioberti’s description of Britain’s role certainly did not 
correspond to the ways in which the British people, during the mid-nineteenth century, 
perceived its position in the world, let alone in Europe. For the Italian political thinker, the 
main point of the comparison was not even to make an argument about Britain. Instead, he 
used the comparison to point his readers to Europe’s political and cultural heterogeneity, 
including differences between its institutions and its constitutional developments. For the 
famous philosopher, Europe did not have one core and many peripheries; and there was not 
one way of being modern. Therefore, Britain could not constitute a model for anybody. 
Convinced of Italy’s cultural and religious legacy as a millennial civilisation of the 
Mediterranean, Gioberti rejected the idea that his country had to be taught lessons by 
seemingly more developed countries elsewhere in Europe or the world.  
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The case of Italy seems particularly relevant when thinking about Britain’s 
relationship to Europe. Was it not Italy that needed guidance, that had to be freed, with 
British help, from despotic Habsburg and Bourbon rulers? And did Britain not attract 
countless Italian exiles that were dissatisfied with their political situation at home? While 
one might take the view that by coming to Britain these exiles ‘voted with their feet’, their 
assessment of British political institutions could be extremely varied; and it shows little of 
the blind admiration Britain so much liked to project on its foreign visitors. Italy’s most 
famous exile in London, Giuseppe Mazzini, was quite open in his rejection of British political 
institutions and the materialism that informed the country’s cultural values. In an essay of 
1847, he insisted that Britain’s “representative government” had nothing to do with 
“representative democracy”, which he saw as the future of his own country. The two 
concepts “have nothing but the word in common.” Moreover, despite the fact that many 
Italians counted on British support in unifying their country, they were suspicious of its 
imperial ambition extending into the Mediterranean. The Tuscan lawyer Giuseppe 
Montanelli, another protagonist of the Revolutions of 1848, went so far as to rank 
Palmerston below Metternich in his list of evil European statesmen, holding him responsible 
for an imperialism that contradicted any true concept of liberalism. In Montanelli’s view, the 
aristocratic foundations of British liberalism constituted a stark contrast to the democratic 
principles that had informed the European revolutions of 1848. This critical attitude towards 
Britain increasingly overshadowed Italian interest in the British tradition of the rule of law. 
Another Italian exile based in London, Giuseppe Angeloni, pointed to the English economic 
mentality and the extent to which structures of power were still determined by land 
ownership. His assessment of the structural inequalities of British society mirrors that of the 
French philosopher Benjamin Constant, who described British society as “a permanent 
conspiracy of the rich ruling class against the poor working class.” Even the philosopher 
Gaetano Filangieri, who frequently praised the English constitution, noticed the deep-
rooted materialism of the English and wrote of their educational system that “no other 
country in Europe makes the acquisition of knowledge so expensive; in no other country you 
need to be so rich to become learned.” Many of these points raised by Britain’s European 
neighbours during the mid-nineteenth century still seem to inform Europeans’ critical 
assessment of the British way of life. 
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To return to the issue of British imperialism, many Italians were aware of the fact 
that Britain’s policies in the Mediterranean were by no means based on altruistic motives. 
Ugo Foscolo was a native of the Ionian island of Zante / Zakynthos, then part of the 
Venetian Republic, and had moved to London at the end of Napoleonic period, where he 
used his Lettere scritte dall’Inghilterra to express his appreciation of English polite society. 
But his views of Britain soon changed. Although the Congress of Vienna had recognised his 
homeland as “The United States of the Ionian Islands,” they soon became part of Britain’s 
informal Empire in the Mediterranean, based on a political regime which many among the 
local population experienced as even more despotic than its previous ‘foreign’ 
governments. When in 1817 Britain returned the city of Parga to the Ottoman Empire, they 
caused a dramatic European refugee crisis, with thousands of locals trying to join the island 
of Corfu. Italian intellectuals were at the forefront of international protests against these 
ruthless policies, frequently comparing their situation to Britain’s attitudes towards its 
American colonies a few decades earlier. Italians were quick to identify further historical 
parallels to unveil similar patterns of British attitudes towards the rest of the world. The 
Sicilian patriot Gioacchino Ventura condemned English rule over the Irish in the harshest 
terms, putting it on equal terms with Bourbon rule over Sicily: “it never was and will never 
be advisable, fair or generous. [...] This unhappy people asks for bread and they reply with 
guns.” Public outrage at Britain’s imperial appetite was frequently combined with critical 
debate on the social cost of Britain’s industrialisation. There was in fact little Italians were 
prepared to admire about Britain’s industrial advances. Carlo Pisacane opined that 
England’s “appearance of grandeur only hides the cancerous sores of that society.” Even a 
close ally of Count Cavour like the Future Italian Prime Minister Marco Minghetti expressed 
his astonishment over “these most unhappy people” of the English working class, and the 
“ignorance" and "immorality” which reigns in England’s factories.  
These few examples shed serious doubts over the British idea that Europe perceived 
its northern neighbour predominantly as a more civilised ‘other’, a country that could teach 
them a better future. From a modern historiographical point of view, any such model, 
where one part of the world has to implement the lessons learned from another, seems to 
aim at reconciling antithetically defined norms of development, explaining the past in terms 
of a predefined philosophy of history, exemplified in this case by Britain’s role in the world. 
Europe always drew on a broad range of cultural legacies and civic traditions, which were 
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revealed according to specific historic conditions and set in complex sets of relationships 
with each other, where “foreign” experiences are constantly translated and assimilated into 
local vocabularies.  It is this complex process of intellectual and cultural exchanges that 
defined the continent’s relationship to Britain, based on a close engagement with political 
institutions and cultural norms from across the channel, without feeling a need to emulate 
the other. In its long history as a part of Europe, Britain has frequently benefitted from 
doing exactly the same. 
Rather than reflecting European attitudes towards Britain, the idea of Britain 
representing the envy of Europe has always been, and still is, a British projection on the 
continent, the wishful thinking of a country that tries to overcome its own identity problems 
by inventing a foreign image of its self-perception. Just as contemporary European discourse 
on Britain frequently refers to a failing health system, a class-based education system and 
the country’s decrepit infrastructure, also the supposedly ‘less advanced’ nations of 
nineteenth-century Europe were fully aware of the limitations of Britain’s contribution to 
civilisation. Using this polemic to point to the ontological difference between Europe’s own 
assessment of its relationship to Britain and British projections on Europe, this is not to 
argue that Europeans did not at times seek to learn from Britain. But within this exercise of 
learning, for much of the continent Britain served as one of many models, and as little more 
than a discursive instrument, that was always met with critical reflection, frequently 
informed by a good deal of pride in the continent’s own political and cultural legacies. Brexit 
is rooted in a long history of distorted views of British hegemony, views that were rarely 
based on hard economic or political facts, but on a discursive relationship fuelled by amour 
propre – selflove depending on the imagined views of others - that in historical perspective 
is easily taken apart. Only if Britain frees itself of this obsession will it be able to discover 
that it has always been part of a larger European whole. It will then see that much of what 
makes Britain’s historical uniqueness is indeed the fruit of its exchanges with Europe and 
the wider world. 
 
